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Abstrak
Makalah ini terdiri daripada tiga bahagian; bahagian
pertama membahaskan makna dan hakikat ilmu, manakala
bahagian kedua membincangkan tingkatan-tingkatan atau
martabat ilmu. Sumber-sumber ilmu serta pencapaiannya
dikupas pada bahagian yang ketiga. Semuanya mengikut
pandangan Ibn 'Arabi dalam beberapa karya tulisan
beliau.
Representing the majority of Muslim's view, the Creed of al-
Nasafi1 teaches that the causes of knowing (asbdb al- 'Urn) for hu
man beings are three: the sound senses, the true report, and reason.
Yet according to the People of Truth (Ahl al-Haqq), it must be
noted, inspiration (al-ilhdm) is not one of the causes of knowing
the soundness of a thing. This cautionary remark is apparently
1 That is the formal statement of the tenets of Islam (al- Aqald) compiled by
Abu 'Umar al-Nasafi, who died (in 1177CE) about thirty years after al-
Ghazali. Nasafi's is not only the most popular credal statement but has been
the subject of numerous commentaries, the most famous of which is the
Sharh at- Aqd'id al-Nasaftyyah by Sa'd at-Dln al-Taftazani (d. 1388CE). On
the creed's spread and its reception in the Malay world, see S.M.N. al-Attas,
The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript: A 16th Century Malay Translation of
the 'Aqd1"id of al-Nasafi (Kuala Lumpur; University of Malaya Publications
Department, 1988).
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made in response to the frequent claim made by sufis to a special
knowledge not accessible to others. Indeed the sufis quite often
disagree on many issues with the philosophers, theologians
(mutakallimun) as well as jurists (fuqaha') who tend to ignore, if
not altogether reject, mystical approach to knowledge and intu
itional method of verification in favour of rationalism and empiri
cism. This essay attempts to explore and expose a sufi epis-
temology2 as it is found in the writings of Muhyi al-Din Ibn 'Arabi
(d. 1240CE). While focussing on such technical terms as 'spiritual
opening' (fath), unveiling (kashf) and 'tasting' (dhawq), I shall also
discuss his classification of knowledge as well as the various
means of its acquisition.
Reality of Knowledge
It is without doubt very difficult to describe the reality of know
ledge, just as it is not a simple task to explain the relationship be
tween the knower and the act of knowing either. Succinctly put,
the problem as to why and how a knowing subject, whether con
sciously or not, becomes united with or otherwise related to an
external object as the thing known remains unresolved. The diffi
culty is further aggravated by the fact that no single definition of
knowledge has ever been agreed upon by scholars. While al-
Jurjani, for instance, defines knowledge f Him) as the arrival of soul
at the meaning of the thing (wusul al-nafs ild ma'nd shay'),3 al-
Ghazali holds mat knowledge is the recognition of the thing as it is
(ma'rifat al-shay'i 'aid md huwa bihi).4 According to Ibn 'Arabi,
however, knowledge is the mental acquisition of [knowing] any
subject-matter within the limit of its being as it is (tahsil al-qalb
amran-md 'ala haddi md huwa 'alayhi dhdlika al-amr); thus,
2 My use of this term is almost literal, meaning simply a 'discourse on
knowledge'. Nevertheless, I do not in any way regard the GreekepistSme as
equal to 'Hm.
3 Al-Jurjani, Kitab al-Ta'rlfdt, (Beirut Maktabat Lubnan, 1985), p. 161.
4 Al-Ghazali, "Kitab al-'Ilm", chap, in Iftya"Ulum al-Din with al-'Iraqi's
assessment, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Iimiyyah, 1986), vol. I, p. 41. Hence
forth cited as Ihyd'.
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knowledge is a property (sifat) which is attributed to the mind
through this acquisition; mind is the knower, matter the known.5
Ibn 'Arabi rejects the well-known theory put forth by logicians
which says that knowledge consists of mental conception
(tasawwur) and assent (tasdiq). Knowledge is neither a mental rep
resentation of the object known nor the meaning (ma'nd) grasped
by knower, says Ibn 'Arabi. For not every thing that is known is
conceivable, and not everyone who knows is able to form a con
cept in his mind.6 As a matter of fact, conception is the knower's
act of imagining, of forming a mental image representing the ob
ject known to him. But this mental representation, according to Ibn
'Arabi, is nothing but a state (hdlat) of mind that is temporarily
held by the knower's imaginative faculty, even though he does not
deny the existence of certain objects of knowledge which transcend
and escape the grasp of human faculty of imagination.7
So what is the reality of knowledge? Whereas for al-Ghazali it
is none other than certitude (yaqin)* for Ibn 'Arabi it is not a
simple question; that is why he discusses it while dealing with the
secret of predetermination (sirr al-qadr), saying that nobody knows
the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the known
object (ta'alluq aVilm bi-l ma'lum) if knowledge is to be under
stood as a complete comprehension of realities. Yet since the real
ity of a thing is that which is left in it after the stripping of the
traces of its properties (salb athar al-aw§af), therefore we can say
5 Ibn 'Arabi, al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah, new ed. Osman Yahia, (Cairo: al-
Maktabah al-'Arabiyyah, 1985), vol. D, p. 82, henceforth cited wFutuhat.
Unless indicated by letter "B" (for Bulaq old edition), further citations thereof
refer to Osman Yahia's edition.
6 Futuhat, vol. I, p. 92. Note that 'mind' is here referred to the totality of
man's spiritual substance comprising all the inner mental faculties. Cf. S.M.N.
al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics ofIslam (Kuala Lumpur: Interna
tional Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995), p. 148: "... [that is]
the reality or very essence of man [which]... has many names [i.e. inteUect,
soul, heart, and spirit]." Hereinafter cited as Prolegomena.
7 Futuhat, vol. I, p. 250.
8 See Mohd Zaidi bin Ismail, "Logic in al-Ghazall's Theory of Certitude", in
al-Shajarak, Vol. 1 Nos. 1&2 (1996), p. 98, for a detailed exposition.
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that the reality of knowledge consists of both epistemic and ontic
all-encompassing (al-ihdtah 'an kulli wajh).9
Nevertheless, the term haqiqah is also often used by Ibn
'Arabi as a synonym for entity ('ayn). That is to say, the reality of
a thing is its immutable entity ('ayn thdbit) or the thing as it is
known by God. Thus another way of defining 'reality' is to call it
the non-manifest dimension of something manifest. For in many
passages Ibn 'Arabi does consider God's Names to be realities
(haqd'iq) as well as the archetypes of all the created things. On
this basis we can say that on Ibn 'Arabi's view the reality of
knowledge is in fact the divine name Knower (al- 'Alim) from
which all knowledge spring out, and the reality of life is His name
Living (al-Hayy) and so forth.10 But let not ibis ontological discus
sion of the immutable entities detain us here.11
Levels of Knowledge
Knowledge is classified by Ibn 'Arabi into three levels. First is the
knowledge of the intellect ('Urn al- 'aql), that is, whatever we ob
tain either necessarily (daruratan) or as a result of intellectual in
quiry. Apparently he is referring here to that kind of knowledge
which comes about through discursive mental processes of concep
tual thinking (fikr) as well as through theoritical consideration
(nazr). The second kind is the knowledge of the spiritual states
(Him al-ahwal), which cannot be reached except through tasting,
like one's knowledge of the sweetness of honey which is impos
sible for him and anyone else to attain or verify without himself
tasting. The third one is the knowledge of the secrets ('Urn al-
asrdr), that is, the knowledge given by God through the blowing of
the Holy Spirit (ruh al-quds) into the hearts of the prophets and the
friends (awliyd') of God. Unlike the possessors of the first two
sorts, the knower of the last kind, according to Ibn 'Arabi, knows
9 Futuhat, vol. XIH, p. 215 and vol. XH, p. 235.
10 Futuhat, B, vol. n, pp. 39 and 563; cf. vol. I, p. 293.
11 For a comprehensive treatment, see al-Attas, Prolegomena, pp. 241-57. Cf.
William C. Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany-New York: SUNY
Press, 1989), pp. 83-8.
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and exhausts all sciences.12
Ibn 'Arabi further distinguishes two ways of acquiring knowl
edge. In one passage he mentions thinking or reflection (fikr) and
bestowal (wahb). The latter is the divine effusion (fayd ildhl)
through which the prophets and saints receive their knowledge,
because reason has no entrance into them through thinking or re
flection, even though they can accept it especially in the case of
those having a sound reason who are not overcome by any obfus-
cation deriving from imagination and reflection (shubhah
khaydliyyahfikriyyah). This is because, according to Ibn 'Arabi,
thinking is prone to corruption (fasdd) and hence may yield conjec
tural and unreliable results (maznunah la yuthaq bihd).13
In another passage, however, Ibn 'Arabi explains that while it
is true that some knowledge is acquired (kasbi) and some is given
(wahbi), there exists only a fine line differentiating the two. For as
a matter of fact, he maintains, both kinds of knowledge are ulti
mately God-given, and the difference lies in the question as to
whether or not it is acquired through any cause or by any means.
That is why for Ibn 'Arabi knowledge that is obtained through
godfearing (taqwd), just like that which derives from the effort of
reason and senses, is not God-given but rather a fruit of some ef
fort (iktisdb). Only that which comes without any means, interme
diary, or cause whatsoever is called God-given knowledge.14
Channels of Knowledge
No doubt Ibn 'Arabi too accepts the popular view that human be
ings know things through their five senses as well as their inner
faculties of mind. But the Shaikh remarks that we must recognize
the limits imposed on these perceptual senses by such factors as
distance, barriers, and weakness which do influence, distort or even
impede our way to acquiring correct, sound knowledge.15 More-
12 Futuhat, vol. I, pp. 138-40.
13 Futuhat, vol. IV, p. 206.
14 Futuhat, vol. IV, pp. 119-22.
15 Futuhat, vol. H, pp. 99 and 343.
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over, the process of perception involves not only the five external
senses but also the internal ones such as the mental faculties (al-
quwa) of imagination (al-mutakhayyilah), thinking (al-mufakkirah),
and the rational (al- 'aqliyyah). According to Ibn 'Arabi, the senses
are never mistaken in perceiving the things which are normally
related to them, such that if they happen to err, nonetheless, the
mistakes belong only to that which passes judgement.16
It should be noted that Ibn 'Arabi not only divides the activity
of the human mind into three kinds; reasoning ('aqt), thinking
(tafakkur), and reflection (nazr), but he also recognizes the differ
ent aspects of human mind, namely reason ('aql), heart (qalb), and
imagination (khaydl), even though they all belong to the same en
tity. In other words, whatever the means by which knowledge is
obtained, the knowing subject is still one; for the above distinction
is drawn to denote the modalities of knowing, as al-Attas puts it:
It [i.e. the mind] has many names because of its accidental
modes or states (ahwdl). Thus when it is involved in intel
lection and apprehension it is called intellect; when it gov
erns the body it is called soul; yet when it is engaged in
receiving intuitive illumination it is called heart; and when
it reverts to its own world of the abstract entities it is
called spirit.17
As shown by its root meaning, the word 'aql signifies that
which ties down and limits the free. It is not mentioned in the
Qur'an except in the verbal forms (ya'qilun, ta'qilun, na'qilu). As
a human faculty, however, 'aql almost always implies restriction
and confinement in that it is by nature inclined to contain thing in
its own realm, thereby creating boundaries for its subject. That is
why, Ibn 'Arabi observes, rational thinkers and logicians reduce
knowledge about everything into definition (hadd), and consequ
ently they fail to comprehend that which refuses to be defined and
resists delimitation such as the realities of God, spirit, death, etc.
16 Futuhdt, vol. H, p. 395.
17 Prolegomena, p. 148. That is, intellect for 'aql, soul for nafs, heart for
qalb, and spirit for ruh.
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which are beyond the stage of reason (ward' tawr al-'aql).n
On the other hand, the Qur'an explicitly employs the term qalb
about 130 times and often attributes understanding and intelligence
to the healthy one (qalb salim). Ibn 'Arabi sees the heart as a place
of constant change and fluctuation as well as a locus for knowl
edge rather than for emotions and feelings. The tremendous capac
ity of the heart places it beyond delimitation (taqyfd) characteristic
of reason. Unlike reason, the heart is nondelimited (mutlaq), free
and absolved from all limitations and constraints. Thus to the ex
tent one verifies the nature and reality of things by means of his
heart he can acquire certain, true knowledge about God and all
metaphysical entities. One must none the less always ensure the
purity and healthiness of the heart so as to prepare it for receiving
knowledge from God.19
As for imagination, it should not be here understood in the
popular sense of the word. When Ibn 'Arabi uses the term 'imagi
nation', he most often has in mind the inter mediary realm ('dlam
al-barzakh) between the spiritual and corporeal world, which is
otherwise called the imaginal world ('dlam al-khaydl) - not imagi
nary one! - or the world of images ('dlam al-mithdl). It refers to
the place where the bodily and non-bodily existent things can take
a shape contrary to its nature or, in Ibn 'Arabi's words, where the
opposites are brought together (al-jam' bayn al-adddd). This is
best exemplified by dreams. For it is in dreaming, which is a func
tion of imagination, that we experience non-physical things - that
is, an image of a tiger or an apple - in bodily forms such that we
perceive and take them as real, tangible objects. Likewise is the
appearance of magical artifacts in a form different from the real
one. It is interesting to note that to account for these phenomena
Ibn 'Arabi employs expressions like corporealization of the spirits
(tajassud al-arwdh) and spiritualization of corporeal bodies
(tarawhun al-ajsdd), concerning which he cites this report: the
Prophet said, "I saw my Lord in the form of a youth."20
18 Futuhdt B, vol II, p. 116.
19 Futuhdt, vol. IV, 322-4; cf. pp. 220-1.
20 Futuhdt B, vol. H, p. 379.
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It is indeed quite difficult to make sense of this issue. But this
is not so if we take into account Ibn 'Arabi's distinction of three
kinds of knowable things (ma'lumdt): [1] a purely abstract, intan
gible meaning (al-ma'nd al-mujarrad 'an al-mdddah) which is
perceived by the rational faculties through proofs or a priori, [2]
the sensory things that are perceivable by the senses, and [3] the
imaginal (not imaginary) things which are perceived either by rea
son or by the senses. The latest kind are at the same time 'mean
ings' that assume shape (tashakkul) in sensory forms given by the
form-giving faculty (al-quwwah al-musawwirah). The process is
then explained as follows. Imagination, now as a mental faculty,
takes a 'meaning', namely a shapeless reality of the world of intel
ligible things and gives to it a sensory form (surah mahsusah).
This takes place, according to Ibn 'Arabi, despite the fact that in
normal circumstances meanings and sensory forms are mutually
exclusive since the former belongs to the World of Intelligence and
are free of any sort of matter, while sensory forms belong to the
external world of corporeal bodies.21
Having distinguished four uses of the term 'imagination',
namely [1] as a barzakh between Being and Nothingness, [2] as
that between the spiritual and physical world, [3] between the mind
and body, as well as [4] one of the mental faculties of man Ibn
'Arabi declares that "he who does not know the level of imagina
tion has no true knowledge whatsoever [and] if this pillar of true
knowledge has not been actualized by the knowers, they have not
a whiff of true knowledge."22 The reason why Ibn 'Arabi calls
imagination a barzakh is that it is 'the meeting place of the two
Seas' - that is, the Sea of Meanings and the Sea of Sensory Things,
because in this intermediary world meanings are embodied and
sensory things are subtilized such that the entity of every object of
knowledge ('ayn al-ma'lum) is 'transformed' or imaginalized in
the viewer's eyes.23
21 FutuhdtB, vol. II, p. 66. But according to al-Attas,ma'ani (sing, ma'na)
in this context should be translated as 'ideal realities' as they do have onto-
logical significance {Prolegomena, p. 250).
22 FutuhatB, vol. II, p. 312.
23 FutuhdtB, vol. II, p. 361.
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Extraordinary Ways of Knowing
Since the sufis, writes Ibn ' Arabi, "saw the mistakes of those who
employ rational consideration, they turned to the path in which
there is no confusion so that (hey might take things from the 'eye
of certitude' ('ayn al-yaqin) and became qualified by certain
knowledge."24 This holds true, for instance, in their attempt to
comprehend the apparently contrary attributes and Names of God
such as the Avenger (DM Intiqdm) and the Forgiving (al-Ghqffar),
the Life-giver (al-Muhyi) and the Slayer (al-Mumit), the Manifest
(al-Zdhir) and the Non-manifest (al-Batin), etc. In this regard Ibn
'Arab! maintains that true knowledge about God can only comes
through unveiling that would enable its possessor to reconcile the
seemingly contradictory positions of affirming comparability
(tashblh) and denying similarity (tanzih). As Ibn 'Arabi sees it,
most rational thinkers, by whom of course he means Muslim theo
logians and philosophers, overemphasized incomparability so much
that they could not put the opposite together.
Moreover, part of the reason why the rational thinkers fell into
a lopsided view of reality, according to Ibn 'Arabi, is that they ig
nore the power of the imaginative faculty which alone is capable to
perceive the true meaning of the Qur'anic depictions of similarity
like that of God's hands, face, and eyes. For the rational faculty,
which is the specific tool by which those thinkers seek to know the
nature and reality of things, always tends to negate anything from
God which does not appear appropriate to 'its own definition1 of
Divinity. Hence they interpret or explain away (ta'wil) these terms
i.e. hands, eyes, etc at the expense of denying God's own assertion
of His manifestation (tajalli) and commanence (ma 'iyyah). Indeed,
in order to understand this issue one must renounce his reason and
give himself to spiritual 'opening', 'tasting', 'unveiling', 'witness
ing'25 etc. But what do the sufis mean by these terms?
One of the most significant way of knowing for Ibn 'Arabi is
'opening' (fatty). The term, the plural of which is futuh and hence
the book's name Futuhdt, is used in technical vocabulary of sufism
24 Futuhdt, vol. H, p. 628.
25 Futuhdt, vol. I, pp. 250-1.
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to indicate the spiritual illumination which marls the acquisition of
a higher station (maqdm) in one's spiritual journey (suluk) and
normally occurs during a retreat (khalwah) as a result of certain
period of self-discipline and training (riyadah).76 According to Ibn
'ArabI, "someone in whomfath preceds' the practice of riyadah -
save in exceptional cases - will not attain to spiritual virility", al
though in his own special case, Ibn 'Arabi claims he had received
such illumination prior to spiritual training, saying that what hap
pened to him was an experience of opening in the state of being
snatched out of himself (wa kanafathtjadhbahfi tilk al-tahzah)27
Like the rest of sufi technical team, fath is borrowed from the
Qur'anic verse, "Verily We have granted Thee a clear victory
(fathan mubind)."2* Although the verb fataha has meanings as di
verse as 'to open (a gate), to unfold (a book), to stimulate (appe
tite), to conquer (a land), and to disclose or reveal (a secret),' the
derivative noun fath in the verse is interestingly qualified by the
adjective mubin, which means 'that which explain, make clear,
show, illumine or shed light' - an adjective given also to the
Qur'an. Seen in this perspective, the sufis are by all means justified
to understand fath as illumination rather man conquest or victory -
that is, a spiritual opening of the heart by God, the Light (al-Nur)
and the Opener (al-Fattdh) who 'teaches mankind what they know
not.' Indeed this is what Ibn 'Arabi explicitly affirms: "... on the
same night of this retreat I received me 'opening' pertaining to the
dhikr I was practicing; its light revealed to me what had so far
been hidden from me (fa-inkashafa li bi nurihi ma kana 'indi
ghayban). "29 So important is the notion of 'opening' for Ibn 'Arabi
26 Ibn 'Arab!, "Istilah al-Sufiyyah" in Rasa'illbn 'Arabi(Hyderabad, 1948),
p. 11. Hereinafter Istilah.,
21 Reported in Ismail ibn Sawdakin, "Kitab Wasa'il al-Sa'il", ed. Manfred
Prifitlich, Die Terminohgie Ibn Arabis im 'Kitab wasa'il al-s'a'il': Text,
Vbersetzung und Analyse (Freiburg-im-Breisgau: K. Schwarz Verlag, 1973),
cited in Claude Addas, Questfor the Red Sulphur, tr. Peter Kingsley (Cam
bridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1993), pp. 36-7.
28 Surat al-Fath (48): 1.
29 Futuhdt B, vol. ffl, p. 488.
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that he devotes a special chapter to explicating the term. What
comes about during such illumination is none other than true
knowledge about the realities and disclosure of secrets.30
Another unusual way of acquiring knowledge for the sufis is
dhawq, which in its etymological sense simply means tasting by
tounge. But the sufis, as does Ibn 'Arabi, use the term in a quite
different sense. For them it refers to the direct knowledge of some
thing through spiritual 'opening' or 'unveiling'. According to Ibn
'Arabi, however dhawq is the first stage of the experience of God's
manifestation (tajalli), while 'drinking' (shurb) is the next stage,
followed by 'quenching' (riyy).3i This is because for the sufis wa
ter symbolizes knowledge so that - to borrow Ibn Arabi's expres
sion - "the seeker of knowledge is like him who drinks the water
of the sea, the more he drinks the thirstier he becomes."32 That is
why even the Prophet was ordered to request from God an increase
in knowledge.33 In short, suffice it to keep in mind Ibn Arabi's
declaration that "knowledge comes only through tasting; that is
what we call knowledge."34
More or less synonymous with spiritual opening is kashf,
which may be defined as an immediate experiential knowledge of
the realities of things - a knowledge that God gives to His servant
through manifestation (tajalli). Ibn Arabi employs the term tajalli
30 See Futuhat B, vol. IV, pp. 220-1 (chapter on Hadrat al-Fath); also vol.
IV, pp. 11-2; vol. I, p. 638 and vol. n, p. 15.
31 Istilah, p. 6. Cf. Futuhat B, vol. H, p. 133 and p. 548.
32 Futuhat B, vol. II, pp. 53-2.
33 Qur'an, Sara* TaHa (20): 114.
4 Futuhat B, vol. II, p. 473. Al-Attas repostulates this point as follows: "As
regards al-dhawq, the basic meaning is 'taste' in the sense applicable to both
pleasure and pain alike. It refers, in the epistemological context here de
scribed, to a kind of intuitive knowledge brought about by a spiritual percep
tion that accompanies the direct experience of verification. The transcendental
vision that it entails refers to that of the pure intellect ('aql mujarrad); and the
spiritual degree of the person in that condition of the intellect is that of the
archetypal realities, in which degree the knowers's verification and cognition
of the transcendent Reality and Truth is called genuine dhawq." See
Prolegomena, p. 203.
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for both divine (theophany) and ordinary manifestations (epipha
nies) interchangeably. But 'unveiling' is a bit different from 'tast
ing' in that dhawq is connected more to spiritual states than to en
tities (a'ydn), whereas kashfis an experience in which the realities
of things are revealed. Ibn 'Arab! further distinguishes between
unveiling and tasting by saying that while kashf is something that
one sees outside oneself, dhawq is one's own inward experience.35
Again it is noticeable that the transitive verb kashafa is always
followed by such such objects as cover (ghitd'l veil (hijdb), and
the invisible (ghayb). Clearly therefore what the sufis mean by
kashf has something to do with the removal of veil and thus seeing
what is now standing forth. According to Ibn 'Arabi, 'unveiling'
takes place when God illuminates the heart, enabling it to see into
the unseen world, not with the physical eyes or sight (basor) but
with the spiritual [injsight (basirah). Among the veils which are
lifted from the heart during such event are rust (rayn), passion
(shahwah), and jealousy-envy (aghyar).36 Now just as physical
objects are not visible without light so too unveiling cannot occur
without the divine light. But the light which comes from God must
coincide with the light inside the heart, since excessive radiance in
theophany does not give knowledge. Ibn 'Arabi explains why this
happens: Since when light is stronger than the light of sight, man
perceives it, but he does not perceives [objects] through it [under
the light]. That is why the Prophet said concerning God, "His veil
is light." Hence unveiling only takes place through a light equiva
lent to that of the insight. Do you not see that bats only come out
35 FutuhatB, vol. n, p. 605.
36 Futuhat B, vol. II, p. 241. Cf. al-Attas's exposition: "At-kashfia akin to the
ocular vision. It is the laying bare of something covered. 'Covered' here per
tains to what is covered to one's state of being or feeling (hal), or to one's
cognition ('Urn or 'irfdn), or to one's sight or vision ('ayn). It is the removal,
by God's grace, of the covering from one's state of being, or cognition, or
vision that enables one to feel, or to know, or to see the reality-truth. It is cer
tain knowledge based on true verification, direct apprehension, and clear vi
sion, uninterrupted by any distraction." Further, al-Attas maintains thatkashf
is normally followed by another experience called wujud (intuition of exist
ence). See Prolegomena, pp. 201-2.
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in light that is equivalent to the light of their sight?37
Nevertheless, we sometimes also find another term for 'unveil
ing' used by the sufis. Al-Ghazali, for instance, employs both
mukashafah and kashfXo designate 'the lifting of wrap off the heart
(inqishd' al-ghishdwah 'an al-qalb)' which enables the eye of the
heart to know the realities of things and foresee the future.38
Hence, al-Ghazali considers the Prophet as the best example of a
person to whom the realities of things are revealed (shakhsun
kushifa bi haqd 'iq al-umur) and the one who possesses the science
of such unveiling ('Urn al-mukdshafah).39 Ibn 'Arabi, on the other
hand, views mukashafah as a kind of spiritual 'opening' which, for
him, consists of [1] the opening of expression (fath al- 'ibdrah), [2]
the opening of sweetness (fath al-haldwah), and [3] (he opening of
revelation (fath al-mukashafah). The first refers to the outward di
mension, while the second to the inward dimension.40 As for the
third kind, Ibn 'Arabi says: "[The opening of] unveiling is the
cause of knowledge of the Real in the things, [because] the things
are like curtains over the Real; when they are lifted, unveiling oc
curs ..."41
In addition to 'opening, tasting, and unveiling', another term
which is frequently used by the sufis to describe their knowledge is
'witnessing' (shuhud or mushdhadah). If the two can be distin
guished from one another, it may be in the sense that shuhud is
employed more generally as a synonym for seeing on any level of
existence,42 whereas mushdhadah [literally means watching or vi
sion) is more often used as a synonym for 'unveiling'. According
to Ibn 'Arabi, however, the sufis define 'witnessing' as the reality
37 Futuhat B, vol. Ill, p. 369.
38 Al-Ghazali, Ihya' (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 1994), vol. V, pp. 126-7.
39 Ibid., vol. m, p. 42.
40 IstUah.p. 11.
41 Futuhat B, vol. II, p. 496.
42 For a comprehensive discussion on this, see S.M.N. al-Attas, The Degrees
of Existence (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and
Civilization, 1995).
93
AFKAR - BE. 3/2002 [81-94]
of certainty without doubt and hesitation (haqiqat al-yaqin bila
shakk wald irtiydb), which follows unveiling and brings about
knowledge about the Real (al-Haqq) as well as about the realities
without exception as they are in themselves.43 In addition, Ibn
'Arabi affirms that 'witnessing' is actually a fruit of true fulfill
ment of one's servitude ('ubudah) and servanthood ('ubudiyyah)
which have been realized through the worship ('ibddah) of God.
Concerning this he says: "This is what I mean by knowledge of the
realities, that is, [witnessing] through unveiling, [for] when man
witnesses the realities he cannot oppose the commands of his Mas
ter to worship - the commands whose bounds and prescripts he ob
serves both within and outside himself."44
Postscript
hi the preceeding pages we have dealt with all relevant points in
Ibn 'Arabi's theory of knowledge which, in my opinion, would be
more than sufficient to represent a sufi epistemology. Although, as
we have seen, he appears to be concerned less with empirical
knowledge than with knowledge about God, Ibn 'Arabi's descrip
tion of the realities pertaining to such key epistemic notions as
'opening, unveiling, witnessing and tasting' unquestionably de
serves our consideration. To sum up, it seems justifiable to say that
a coherent sufi theory of knowledge like Ibn 'Arabi's if fully ap
preciated and well taken into account, could be a plausible alterna
tive to modern epistemologies. Allahu a 'lam.
43 Futuhdl B, vol. II, p. 495. Cf. al-Attas's definition of 'witnessing' as the
trans-empirical vision and intuition of existence by wiiich the heart comes to
know directly and [comes] to verify what it knows. Then he goes on describ
ing how it takes place: "Both shuKud and dhawq occur when the veil of sepa
rate objects and phenomenal forms is removed from the cognitive vision of
one who is involved in ihefana'-baqa' experience." See Prolegomena, pp.
203 and 201.
44 Futuhat B, vol. H, p. 308. Cf. vol. I, p. 276.
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